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The Constitution Should Protect
Everyone-Even Lawyers
THE HONORABLE ARTHUR GILBERT*t
AND
WILLIAM GORENFELD**
This comment explores the conscription of lawyers to represent
indigent defendants in civil actions initiated by the state. A good
starting point is that "I[t] he Constitution of the United States is a
law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers
with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times,
and under all circumstances."1 The United States Supreme Court
has held that "[t]he Constitution of the United States was
designed for the common and equal benefit of all the people of
the United States" 2 and was to favor "no racial group, no political
or social group."3
Should these notions of protection for "all classes of men" ap-
ply when the class is composed of lawyers? Of course it should,
as would argue most lawyers, many of whom have been con-
cerned about protecting the constitutional rights of their clients,
but who are now concerned about their own constitutional rights,
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1. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
2. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816) (recognizing
the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court extends to any case which
questions the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or an authority exercised under
that of the United States).
3. Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 406 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
as well. They may be worried because the legal profession is one
of the most maligned in the world. Will Rogers, for example, once
commented that, "[p]ersonally, I don't think that you can make a
lawyer honest by an act of the legislature. You've got to work on
his conscience-and his lack of conscience is what makes him a
lawyer."4 On occasion, criticism comes from those within its own
ranks. "I think the legal profession, as a whole, presents a very
sad spectacle. I fear that it has become so legalized and commer-
cialized in its higher strata and has so little professional and pub-
lic spirit throughout that it is lagging behind the other
professions." 5
To depict the problem of mandatory attorney representation
without compensation, a hypothetical case will be used based on
California law. A brief summary will reflect the views for requir-
ing free legal services to defendants in civil cases. After develop-
ing this foundation, there will be an analysis of the equal
protection rights of the attorney. Finally, there will be a discus-
sion of the impact of a failure to resolve this issue.
I. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
A lawyer's confrontation with the Constitution may come about
fortuitously. The following scenario provides an example of how
the rights of the client and the lawyer may come to an impasse.
Let us assume that a county in California files a civil action
against a defendant, named Gloucester, 6 to establish his paternity
of a minor child, and to require him to pay child support under
California's Welfare and Institutions Code.7
The county is motivated to file this action because California re-
quires that as a condition of receiving Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) benefits,8 a parent assigns to the
4. B. STERLING, THE BEST OF WILL ROGERS 213 (Crown Publishing 1979).
5. H. F. STONE, PILLAR OF THE LAW, ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON (Viking Press
1956).
6. See W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR.
7. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350 (West 1980). This code section requires
noncustodial parents to reimburse the county for any public assistance provided
to their children unless that parent is properly paying his court-ordered support
payments. In County of Ventura v. Tillett, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 114, 183 Cal. Rptr.
741, 747 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1061 (1983), the court of appeal held that an
indigent defendant who is prosecuted by the district attorney for failure to pay
child support is constitutionally entitled to the appointment of free legal counsel
to represent him. See Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
8. In 1974, Congress amended the Social Security Act because the welfare
rolls reflected that a significant number of children participating in the AFDC pro-
gram were not supported by their absent parents. Note, Child Support Enforce-
ment and Establishment of Paternity as Tools of Welfare Reform, 52 WASH. L. REV.
169, 170-72 (1976). This article provides a comprehensive discussion of the state re-
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county his or her right to child support from the absent parent
and agrees to assist in proving the paternity of any illegitimate
children for whom aid is claimed. 9
Defendant Gloucester claims indigency and moves to have the
court appoint counsel to represent him. In criminal cases, indi-
gents are entitled to legal representation. 0 In California, the pub-
lic defender provides representation for indigents charged with
criminal offenses." When the public defender has a conflict, then
a private attorney is chosen by the court to represent the defend-
ant. This attorney is paid for his services by funds allocated by
the Board of Supervisors of the particular county involved.12
quirements under the congressional scheme. Congressional studies also estab-
lished that "the largest single factor accounting for the increase in the AFDC rolls
is illegitimacy." Id. at 170 n.19 (citation omitted). Consequently, state and federal
legislation was enacted to require absent parents of children receiving AFDC to
repay all-or at least a portion-of the public funds expended to support their chil-
dren. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 29-32, 593 P.2d 226, 231-33, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 534-
36, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
9. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11477 (West Supp. 1984).
As a condition of eligibility for aid paid under this chapter, each appli-
cant or recipient shall:
(a) Assign to the county any rights to support from any other person
such applicant may have in their own behalf or in behalf of any other fam-
ily member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and
which have accrued at the time such assignment is made. Receipt of pub-
lic assistance under this chapter shall operate as an assignment by opera-
tion of law.
Id.
10. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing the constitutional
right of an indigent to have representation by counsel during a trial for non-capital
felonies).
11. CAL GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West Supp. 1984). This statute not only requires
the public defender to represent indigent criminal defendants, but also requires
the public defender to act as counsel in some forms of civil actions. If requested,
the public defender must prosecute actions for: the collection of wages (if under
$100); any civil case where the defendant is being persecuted or harassed; any ac-
tion under Division 4 of the Probate Code and Part 1 of Division 5 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code; any action under Chapter 2 of Part 1 of Division 2 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code and any action under section 6861 of the Penal
Code. The public defender may act as counsel in other actions arising from crimi-
nal or juvenile proceedings where the party may be punished by detention.
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2 (West Supp. 1984) states in part:
(a) In any case in which a person, including a person who is a minor,
desires but is unable to employ counsel and in which counsel is assigned
in the superior court, municipal court, or justice court to represent such a
person in a criminal trial, proceeding or appeal, such counsel, in a county
or city and county in which there is no public defender, or in a case in
which the court finds that because of conflict of interest or other reasons
the public defender has properly refused to represent the person accused,
shall receive a reasonable sum for compensation and for necessary ex-
But Gloucester is being sued in a civil action. In certain civil
actions an indigent defendant is entitled to representation.13 In
Payne v. Superior Court,14 the California Supreme Court held
that an indigent, incarcerated defendant who is sued civilly has a
constitutional right to representation. In Salas v. Cortez,I5 the
California Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant in a
paternity suit filed by the state is entitled to appointed counsel.
When Gloucester requests appointed counsel, the trial court faces
a dilemma-whom to appoint? Salas left open the intriguing
question of how to recruit such counsel.' 6 The trial court wants to
accommodate Gloucester as soon as possible, but who is in sight?
II. A QUEST FOR REPRESENTATION
The court might look to either public defenders or to attorneys
from the public sector to find representation for defendants in
civil litigation.
A. Public Defender
May the court appoint the public defender?17 Government
penses, the amount of which shall be determined by the court, to be paid
out of the general fund of the county.
(b) The sum provided for in subdivision (a) may be determined by con-
tract between the court and . . . attorneys after consultation with the
[county] board of supervisors as to the total amount of compensation and
expenses to be paid, which shall be within the amount of funds allocated
by the board ... for the cost of assigned counsel in such cases.
13. For example, indigent parents are entitled to the appointment of counsel
when the right to custody and care of their children is at issue. See, e.g., In re Jac-
queline H., 21 Cal. 3d 170, 175-76, 577 P.2d 683, 686-87, 145 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551-52(1978) (appeal from proceedings to terminate parental rights).
It has been persuasively argued that the poor have both a common law and con-
stitutional right to counsel in all civil cases. See, e.g., Johnson & Schwartz, Beyond
Payne: The Case for a Legally Enforceable Right to Representation in Civil Cases
for Indigent California Litigants, The Legal Arguments, 11 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 249
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Johnson & Schwartz]; Weinstein, The Poor's Right to
Equal Access to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REV. 651 (1981); Note, The Right to Counsel
in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966); Note, The Emerging Right of
Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 554
(1976); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545
(1967).
14. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1976) (Payne had been convicted of receiving the stolen property of a competitor.
He was jailed, and prior to his release from jail his competitor filed a civil com-
plaint seeking damages for conversion. Payne's attorney sought to be relieved as
counsel due to the likelihood that he would not be paid. Consequently, a default
judgment on the civil complaint was entered against Payne since he could neither
appear on his own behalf or hire counsel to represent him).
15. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 539, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900
(1979).
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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Code section 27706 outlines the duties of a public defender.18
These duties include providing representation for indigents
charged with contempt or criminal offenses, and providing repre-
sentation in certain specified civil actions.19 In the absence of
statutory authorization, the court has no jurisdiction to compel
public defenders to serve in any capacity other than those enu-
merated.20 Since this section does not authorize the appointment
of public defenders in civil support and paternity actions, the
court may not appoint public defenders to assume this task.21
B. The Private Sector
The trial court must therefore look to the private sector. In re-
cent years it has not been a great problem recruiting attorneys in
criminal cases in California. These attorneys know they will be
compensated. There may not, however, be hordes of altruistic at-
torneys clamoring to provide representation without compensa-
tion to poor defendants in civil matters.
The trial judge may then look to Business and Professions Code
section 6068, subdivision (h) which states: "It is the duty of an at-
torney: ... (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to
himself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed."22 Thus
armed, the court may waive an admonishing moral finger at attor-
neys, reminding them that they are duty bound not to reject
18. CAL. GOV' CODE § 27706 (West Supp. 1984). See supra note 11.
19. Id. The public defender is authorized to defend any person in a civil ac-
tion if that person is being persecuted or harassed.
20. See also Littlefield v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 652, 160 Cal. Rptr. 175(1979) (while in some instances the public defender may have the option to repre-
sent a defendant if he chooses, CA. GOV'T CODE § 27706(q), it is clear from this
case that the public defender may not be compelled to represent indigents whom
they are not statutorily required to represent).
What if the trial court tries to circumvent section 27706 and the Littlefield hold-
ing by attempting to clothe the public defender in a different suit for purposes of
representing Mr. Gloucester? For example, the court may choose to look solely at
his status as an attorney. Our supreme court has construed the penal code so that
courts "should not encourage imaginative ways to avoid the clear intent of the leg-
islature. . . ." Rhinehart v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal. 3d 772, 779, 677 P.2d 1206, 1211,
200 Cal. Rptr. 916, 921 (1984).
21. See supra note 11. See also Erwin v. Appellate Dep't, 146 Cal. App. 3d 715,
194 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1983) (defendant was convicted of numerous misdemeanor
charges over a two-year period. In each case the defendant had refused counsel
and had appeared in propria persona. The defendant subsequently sought repre-
sentation by the public defender at the appellate level).
22. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 1974). See generally Rauch, Public
Interest Law: Should Lawyers Pick Up the Tab?, 61 A.B.A. J. 453 (1975).
causes of the defenseless or oppressed.23
The judge may consider what the court in Payne v. Superior
Court24 proposed:
The state also apparently assumes that if this court orders counsel ap-
pointed in certain cases, it will mandate that counsel be paid from public
funds. We do not assert such power. If and how counsel will be compen-
sated is for the Legislature to decide. Until that body determines that ap-
pointed counsel may be compensated from public funds in civil cases,
attorneys must serve gratuitously in accordance with their statutory duty
not to reject the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.25
Does Payne really intend by this dictum, carefully ensconced in
a footnote, 26 to give the court the awesome power to force attor-
neys to work against their will? Does Business and Professions
Code section 6068, subdivision (h), a rule of professional conduct,
mean to so radically change society?27 Do not lawyers also have
rights?
III. VIEWS REGARDING COMPULSORY REPRESENTATION TO
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
A. Traditional Approach
In theory, all indigent civil litigants were afforded the assistance
of free counsel under the common law of England.28 Thus, some
courts have concluded that representation of indigents is tradi-
tionally a professional obligation of the bar, which a lawyer un-
dertakes when he becomes a member of the bar.29
Some commentators have suggested that this traditional view
of the past is inaccurate. In 1980, Harvard law professor David
Shapiro examined a number of British and American eighteenth
23. The legal profession is reminded that "the practice of law is a profession-
not a business or skilled trade. While the elements of gain and service are present
in both, the difference between a business and a profession is essentially that
while the chief end of a trade or business is personal gain, the chief end of a pro-
fession is public service." In re Jacobson, 240 S.C. 436, 448, 126 S.E.2d 346, 353
(1962).
24. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
25. Id. at 920 n.6, 553 P.2d at 574 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.6. This view has also
been taken in Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(indigent parents being prosecuted in a child neglect proceeding); County of Tu-
lare v. Ybarra, 143 Cal. App. 3d 580, 192 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1983) (paternity action);
County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1978)
(defendant was an indigent prisoner in a wrongful death action).
26. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
27. For a comparison of § 6068 and the related obligation of the client to pay
his attorney's fee, see Note, Effect ofAttorney's Discharge on Duty to Pay Fee, 61
CALlF. L. REV. 397 (1973).
28. See also Johnson & Schwartz, supra note 13, at 251.
29. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 978 (1965); see also Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61 (1860).
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and nineteenth century cases involving appointment of counsel,
and addressed the question of a court's authority to compel an
unwilling private attorney to represent an indigent. He
concluded:
To justify coerced, uncompensated legal services on the basis of a firm tra-
dition in England and the United States is to read into that tradition a
story that is not there. The occasions on which lawyers have given their
time and abilities at little or no cost-either on their own initiative or at a
court's request--are surely beyond counting. And the sense that doing so
is a fulfillment of a high professional aspiration has often been expressed.
But the notion that an unwilling lawyer could be forced to serve without
fee, though not without its advocates over the centuries, seems never to
have found universal acceptance. At least before the latter part of the
nineteenth century, that notion is even harder to document in particular
instances than it is to support with general pronouncements .... 30
B. Modern Perspective
Luther M. Swygert, Senior Judge, United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh District, in his discussion of the history of
the right to counsel in civil cases in England from 1216 to the
present, states:
Even if an indigent civil plaintiff gained access to the courts, judges rarely
exercised their power to appoint counsel. Aside from the sergeants-at-
law, who were officers of the court in the truest sense, there was substan-
tial doubt about a judge's power to compel an unwilling private lawyer to
donate his services. While the basis of objections by lawyers to represen-
tation of the poor was clearly pecuniary, the failure of the English judici-
ary to enforce the letter and spirit of the 1495 statute was problematic.
Class antagonism may have played some part, but the English trial judges
were also concerned about abuses by bad faith claimants and had an un-
derstandable opposition to a greatly increased work load.3 1
In 1949, the British government enacted legislation providing
funds for legal counsel appointed to represent the poor in civil
matters.32
The uncompensated impressment of attorneys is occasionally
justified on the notion that the practice of law, as distinguished
30. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735,
753 (1980). Professor Shapiro's article goes on to analyze the response of the
American courts, the constitutional issues, the economic arguments and concludes
that "[a] lawyer who accepts an appointment to render legal services despite per-
sonal views or inadequate financial reward will, in all likelihood, be fulfilling the
highest aspirations of the profession; a lawyer who refuses to serve without good
reason will not." Id. at 792.
31. Swygert, Should Indigent Civil Litigants in Federal Courts Have a Right to
Appointed Counse4 39 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1267, 1270-73 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Swygert].
32. Id. at 1273.
from other trades, "is a professional privilege conferred by the
state, one of the conditions of which is that the attorney not reject
'the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.' "33
The dictum in Payne did not address the constitutional equal
protection issue raised by the conscription of attorneys without
compensating them. As the late Justice Hopper remarked in his
dissent in County of Fresno v. Superior Court.3 4
The thrust of the controversy in Payne was on the 'right to counsel.'
There simply was no written argument on the issue of compensation (and
in particular about compensation when legal services were unavailable
due to conflicts). The parties in Payne just assumed the compensation is-
sue would be resolved as a matter of course. In short, the matter of pay-
ment from public funds was never fully briefed, fully argued, or fully
considered by the parties.
I cannot agree that the Supreme Court has made a definitive ruling on
the subject. The matter is still an open question. In such a situation, an
intermediate appellate court should try to bring areas of legal uncertainty
to light and sharpen the issues for ultimate consideration by the Supreme
Court.3 5
The myth that the court has the power to compel an attorney to
provide free legal services was laid to rest in the state of Indiana
some 130 years ago in the frequently cited case of Webb v.
Baird.36 The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the contention that
the bar, being granted special privileges, was under a noblesse
oblige to provide uncompensated services.3 7
The idea of one calling enjoying peculiar privileges, and therefore being
more honorable than any other, is not congenial to our institutions. And
that any class should be paid for their particular services in empty honors,
is an obsolete idea, belonging to another age and to a state of society hos-
tile to liberty and equal rights. 3 8
33. County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 196, 146 Cal. Rptr.
880, 882 (1978).
Certainly the position of an attorney at law in this regard can be distin-
guished from that of a plumber, a barber, a grocer, a clothing store owner
or an automobile dealer. The practice of law is a professional privilege
conferred by the state, one of the conditions of which is that the attorney
not reject "the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed .... .
Id. at 196, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 883. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(n) (West 1974).
34. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 199, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 885 (Hopper, J., dissenting).
The failure of the supreme court in Payne to rule on the issue, due in large part
to the inexactitude of the parties briefing the court and arguing the matter, has
allowed the decision to forecast an inadequate or incomplete discussion of the law
in this area. Reliance on Payne in this area is therefore incorrect. Id.
35. Id.
36. 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
37. Id. at 18. "An attorney of the Court is under no obligation, honorary or
otherwise, to volunteer his services .... It is precisely like providing for the
wants of the poor in other respects." Id.
38. Id. at 16 (an obsolete idea to the judiciary of Indiana in 1954, but not obso-
lete to the California courts in 1984).
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C. Changed Conditions
Today's attorney occupies an even less privileged position than
in the past, and thus should not be forced to dispense his services
gratuitously. The cost of contributing free legal services may be
prohibitive. Recent years have witnessed the removal of a
number of obstacles designed by the legal profession to prevent
competition.39
Although the special preserves of the legal profession have
been reduced in recent years, the cost of running a law office has
increased. In discussing the venerable case of Rowe v. Yuba
County,40 the supreme court held that, in the absence of a statute,
an attorney appointed by the court to represent an indigent per-
son is not entitled to compensation. Alternatively, the dissent in
County of Fresno v. Superior Court4l contains the following
observation:
The attorney at the time of Rowe had virtually no overhead. "He did not
have to purchase any complicated office equipment. His library expenses
were almost nil. He had no staff to pay. Rent was low. There was no such
thing as telephone, jet transportation, and all the other enormous ex-
penses that every busy practitioner encounters today."42
To make a decent living today, the attorney has to handle a tre-
mendous number of cases-much more than was required at the
inception of the rule of Rowe. "Furthermore, expanding concepts
in law have increased the volume of assignments, the complexity
of the issues involved, and a mushrooming of the duties involved
in an appointed case."43
39. See, e.g., Bates and O'Steen v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (blanket sup-
pression of attorney advertising not allowed); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975) (minimum fee schedules violative of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act); Jacoby v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 562 P.2d 1326, 138
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977) (attorney's statements had constitutionally protected value, al-
though indirectly contrued as possible solicitation; professional advertising was
not decided as an issue).
40. Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61 (1860).
[I]t is part of the general duty of counsel to render their professional serv-
ices to persons accused of crime, who are destitute of means, upon the ap-
pointment of the Court, when not inconsistent with their obligations to
others; and for compensation, they must trust to the possible future abil-
ity of the parties.
Id. at 63.
41. 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 198, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880, 884 (1978) (Hopper, J.,
dissenting).
42. Id. at 202, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (citing Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts---A
Suggested Solution 74 CAsE & COM. 3, 8 (July-Aug. 1969)).
43. Id.
D. The Waning Incentive to Aid Indigents
At the time that Payne was decided, there was a considerable
amount of confidence that the newly created Legal Services Cor-
poration would greatly expand its funding of legal aid programs."
During the years from 1976-1981, there was a steady growth in the
size and vitality of the free legal aid movement. In 1981, the Rea-
gan Administration requested that Congress eliminate funding for
the Legal Services Corporation.4 5 Congress responded by cutting
funding the next fiscal year, 1982, by twenty-five percent.4 6 Al-
though there has been some restoration of funding, these pro-
grams, even when fully funded, were only able to provide legal
assistance to twenty percent of the estimated thirty million poor
persons in this country.47
IV. THE CONsTIruIONAL DILEMMA-EQUAL
PROTECTION VIOLATION
Two constitutional rights are in conflict. On the one hand, indi-
gent defendants are constitutionally entitled to legal counsel in
state-initiated paternity actions.46 On the other hand, it is a de-
nial of equal protection of the law to require a particular class of
persons to pay for the cost of this representation. 49
Article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution provides in
pertinent part that "[a] person may not be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law or denied equal pro-
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996 - 2996j (1982). '"The Congress finds and declares that-(1)
there is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation for
individuals who seek redress of grievances .... "
45. 97 LA. Daily J., Jan. 17, 1984, at 1, col. 2. "The Legal Services Corp. is mov-
ing to cut off funding to the Los Angeles-based Western Center on law and poverty
.... LSC's preliminary determination to deny funds to the programs marks the
first such bid by the conservative management installed by President Reagan."
46. See Legal Services Corporation Act Amendments of 1981, Report No. 97-97
to accompany H.R. 3480. "[Tihe corporation should be continued... but in light
of the needs for fiscal restraint, it has reduced its funding level ... resulting in a
25 percent saving.. . ." Id. at 10.
47. See Swygert, supra note 31, at 1267.
48. See Johnson & Schwartz, supra note 13, at 249. See also Salas v. Cortez, 24
Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
49. The Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 2-24, im-
pliedly provides that an attorney does not have to represent one who cannot pay.
This section specifically states:
A layman whose financial ability is not sufficient to permit payment of
any fee cannot obtain legal services, other than in cases where a contin-
gent fee is appropriate, unless the services are provided for him. Even a
person of moderate means may be unable to pay a reasonable fee which is
large because of the complexity, novelty, or difficulty or the problem or
similar factors.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY EC 2-24 (emphasis added).
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tection of the laws."5 0 This provision serves to ensure that the
rights of all "persons similarly situated with respect to the legiti-
mate purpose of the law receive like treatment."5 '
The equal protection clause prohibits states from invidiously
discriminating between persons or groups. 52 Thus, in applying
this provision, one must first identify the class which has been
differentiated under the law.53 The class here consists of lawyers.
To permit the appointment of unwilling counsel to represent in-
digent defendants such as Mr. Gloucester would be to single out
the legal profession as a class to provide free representation to in-
digents in state-instituted paternity and child support actions.
The attorney would, in effect, be forced to give away a portion of
his livelihood. As one commentator notes:
It is unfair to put on any working group the burden of providing for the
needy out of its stock in trade. No one would suggest that the individual
grocer or builder should take the responsibility of providing the food and
shelter needed by the poor. The same conclusion applies to the lawyer.
The lawyer's stock in trade is intangible-his time fortified by his intellec-
tual and personal qualities, and burdened by his office expenses. To take
his stock in trade is like stripping the shelves of the grocer or taking over
a subdivision of the builder.5 4
The privilege to practice law is a valuable property right. The
right to engage in this vocation, or others, must not be predicated
upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights.55
Once the class has been identified, the court determines
whether the denial of equal protection to this group bears a legiti-
mate state purpose. Under the traditional test, the court deter-
mines whether the classification bears a "rational relationship" to
a legitimate state purpose.5 6 While it is a legitimate state purpose
50. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
51. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 578, 456 P.2d 645, 653, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 77, 85 (1969).
52. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See generally Tussman & ten Broek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAu. L REV. 341 (1949).
53. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784, 471 P.2d 487, 500, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839,
852 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 403 U.S. 915 (1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922
(1971).
54. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Indi-
vidual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L REV. 438, 444 (1965). See also
The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel Systen" A Constitutional and Social
Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J. 710, 715 (1972).
55. Winner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963); In
re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982).
56. See generally Westbrook, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970),
vacated on other grounds, 403 U.S. 915 (1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
to provide representation for indigent defendants, that goal is
frustrated when lawyers are compelled to give free representa-
tion. How ironic it would be if in our effort to provide justice to
the indigent litigant, we deny it to his attorney. It is a denial of
equal protection when the government seeks to charge the cost of
operation of a state function conducted for the benefit of the pub-
lic to a particular class. 57
V. IMPACT OF COMPELLED REPRESENTATION-SECOND CLASS
REPRESENTATION
In addition to constitutional and historical reasons, there are
strong policy considerations that dictate against a program of
compelled altruism. The county and state public defender pro-
grams were originally created in response to the concern over the
shoddy quality of legal services donated to indigent criminal de-
fendants.58 To compel attorneys to provide representation with-
out compensation in civil cases is to subvert the goal of providing
qualified legal representation to the poor in paternity cases. It
also creates a nightmare.
57. See Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 722-23, 388
P.2d 700, 724, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492 (1964), remanded, 380 U.S. 194, subsequent op., 62
Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
58. Erwin, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 719, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 330. See Cuff, Public De-
fender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 MnN. L. REV. 715 (1961). See also Erwin,
Uncompensated Counsel They Do Not Meet the Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.
J. 435 (1963). It was observed 67 years ago that:
The courts do appoint lawyers to defend such persons-but are they really
defended? These attorneys serve without compensation, except that in
some states a fee is paid in murder cases.. . . On very rare occasions dis-
tinguished counsel is assigned to defend a prisoner, but, as a general rule,
these assignments go to young and inexperienced attorneys--very often to
the practitioner who happens to be in court at the time .... The classes
of lawyers who are usually assigned to defend, present a phase of this
question which cannot be regarded as unimportant. It is a regrettable fact
that in nearly all communities (particularly in the larger cities) there is a
type of lawyers who are not truly representative of a great profession.
Their regard for the rights and liberties of their clients is measured solely
from a commercial or financial standpoint. These are more persistent
than any other lawyers in their search for clients. Too frequently their
services, if rewarded by small fees, are half-hearted or openly negligible.
This leaves their clients practically or wholly unprotected. They are com-
monly referred to as "shysters," but also described as "snitch lawyers,"
"jail lawyers," "vampires," "legal vermin," "harpies" and by other inele-
gant but extremely emphatic phraseology. They are grasping and merce-
nary-without character ability or conscience. They prey upon the
ignorance or fear of the prisoner, or of his relatives or friends, in their ef-
fort to extort a fee. If it be not forthcoming (or often when it is) they ad-
vise the prisoner to plead guilty, on the pretext that he will get greater
leniency from the court than by standing trial. He may at times go
through the forms of a trial, but the defense is perfunctory on its face, and
the client pays often for his poverty.
GoLDMAN, THE PuBIuc DEFENDER 16, 18-20 (1917).
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It is commendable that many lawyers in this state participate in
a variety of voluntary pro bono programs.5 9 These noble efforts
are to be encouraged and with any luck will increase.60 Forcing
lawyers to handle the defense of paternity and child support mat-
ters may dampen their enthusiasm to participate in existing pro
bono programs. This, of course, would injure these worthwhile
programs, many of which are in their infancy and barely surviving
on meager resources.
Just as compelled representation without compensation denies
the attorney equal protection of the law, it may also deprive the
indigent of effective assistance of counsel.61 In our hypothetical
case, for example, an attorney who lacks civil trial experience
may be inadvertently appointed by the court to represent
Gloucester.62 Even when an attorney has the requisite experi-
59. The State Bar of California, Office of Legal Services Voluntary Legal Serv-
ices Program offers a booklet entitled "Coming to the Aid of Legal Services."
This booklet offers proffies of some local bar pro bono programs to exemplify the
variety and scope of ongoing programs throughout the state. The focus in some
cases is medium urban, large urban, small to medium rural. The programs pro-
ified are Amicus Publico, Orange County; Fresno County Voluntary Legal Services
Program; Napa County Legal Assistance Agency; Pro Bono Publico Program, Riv-
erside County; Public Counsel, Los Angeles County; Public Service Law Corpora-
tion, Riverside County; Seniors' Law Project, Kern County; Ventura Free Legal
Clinic, Ventura County, Voluntary Legal Services Program, Santa Barbara
County.
We also recognize that lawyers as well as others provide financial assistance to
public interest law firms such as the Pacific Legal Foundation in Sacramento, and
Public Advocates in San Francisco.
Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court said in her 1984 State
of the Judiciary Address during the State Bar's annual meeting,
Throughout the state, lawyers are contributing their time, talent, and en-
ergy in an amazing variety of ways .... They participate in telephone
assistance programs. They serve on the boards of directors of nonprofit
legal services programs. They work as volunteers in such programs for in-
digents, immigrants, the handicapped, and others who would otherwise
have no access to legal aid. [ I On both a professional and personal level,
lawyers deserve credit for these social contributions, and I think such rec-
ognition is long overdue.
60. In the wake of inadequate funding in legal assistance programs, it becomes
particularly urgent that members of the bar intensify their efforts to carry a
greater portion of the responsibility to provide representation to the poor.
61. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
62. The Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 6-101 prohibits
an attorney from providing services in an area of law in which he is unfamiliar.
See also Lewis v. State Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 683, 621 P.2d 358, 170 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1981);
Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 414-15, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720 (1979). Conse-
quently, corporate attorneys who are involved in civil litigation would not be ap-
pointed to perform this task.
An even more compelling argument is that cases involving parental rights are
ence, there are serious concerns whether such an attorney
drafted into providing free services to an indigent may be able to
provide the same attention normally provided to a paying client.
Every attorney would derive satisfaction from a job done well, but
it may be unrealistic for us to expect "satisfaction" to constitute
the sole motivation for an attorney to expend the maximum effort.
The more conscientiously the attorney fights for the indigent's
cause, the greater the financial loss suffered by the attorney. 63
The attorney may also be distracted by concerns over unfinished
business at the office on the one hand, and the possible contempt
citation hovering in the background on the other.6 4
Some attorneys may find shortcuts particularly seductive. In a
close case, an attorney may encourage an indigent defendant to
stipulate to judgment. This would effectively avoid the cost and
time involved in a full trial. This situation may occur not because
the attorney has any evil motive, but only because he may feel it
too onerous to proceed with discovery and a full-scale trial in a
frequently far more complex than usually acknowledged. "Domestic relations liti-
gation [is] one of the most important and sensitive tasks a judge faces .... " In
re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 422, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1977). As
the court in Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695 (1984) states:
The stakes in this case are too great not only for the lawyers and court
personnel but also for the parents and children involved in neglect cases
to let stand a judgment mistakenly entered without any judicial inquiry
upon "facts"-that representation of parents in neglect cases entails mini-
mum time and effort and need exact no substantial premium in time or
talent from legal advocates-which are widely perceived in the local bar
and in the community at large, not to be true, and which have been the
core of a decade-old controversy. Such a judicial affirmation made without
an adequate inquiry into these facts' truth or falsity would, we fear, invite
disrespect of the courts and undermine the credibility of their procedures.
Id. at 708-09 (footnote omitted).
63. Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts-A Suggested Solution, 74 CASE & COM.
3, 8-9 (July-Aug. 1969).
An individual practitioner today has overhead that might range from $10
to $20 or more for each hour that he is working. If he is called to serve
under a court appointment for an indigent defendant, he might be ex-
pected to spend 20 to 100 hours. This means that he will have to pay out
of his own pocket for the actual work that can be directly attributable to
this case anywhere from several hundred dollars to thousands of dollars.
Id. at 8.
64. An attorney owes an obligation not only to his client but also to the
courts and the justice system not to undertake legal representation in
matters unless he has adequate time to pursue the matter with reasonable
diligence. When an attorney takes on more than he can properly handie,
he jeopardizes both his client's cause and the public interest in sound and
efficient administration of justice.
Lopez v. Larson, 91 Cal. App. 3d 383, 400, 153 Cal. Rptr. 912, 922 (1979).
What if appointed counsel makes an assessment that his client's position is
without merit? Or what happens if the proposed client has a history of com-
plaining about the competency of appointed counsel? Does the existence of these
factors permit appointed counsel to withdraw and thereby leave the indigent with-
out representation? See Bradshaw v. District Court, 472 F.2d 515 (1984).
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case that has a limited chance of success. Conversely, in a margi-
nal case, an attorney might feel compelled to go through a full-
scale trial for fear of being accused of giving less than one hun-
dred percent effort for the indigent defendant. An additional mo-
tivation may involve the specter of a possible malpractice suit. In
either event, the indigent suffers.
It is not suggested that these problems will occur in all cases,
but by requiring attorneys to work for nothing, the courts may un-
wittingly be creating a form of second-class representation.
Surely, this is not what the supreme court had in mind when it
ruled that paternity and support matters involve issues of consti-
tutional magnitude, thereby mandating the appointment of coun-
sel.6 5 It is obvious the supreme court intended indigent
defendants to have the benefit of effective assistance of counsel.
The court of appeal in Luke v. County of Los Angeles 66 stated:
Effective representation today requires counsel experienced in the partic-
ular field of law involved. Yet to acquire this experience and maintain an
acceptable level of competency in a given field of the law demands contin-
uous study, application and practice. We think the days are past when a
lawyer could be expected to do this solely as public service. If society is
to demand representation by counsel in an expanding variety of proceed-
ings and to insist on a high level of competency in the performance of
such representation, then counsel should be paid. Is it reasonable today
to attach to a statute which provides for court-appointed counsel in a cus-
todial proceeding an interpretation that appointed counsel will render his
services for nothing?
We think not.6
7
By what method shall the court exercise its discretion in ap-
pointing counsel so that the burden will be fairly distributed
among members of the bar? Presumably, the court will appoint
only competent counsel. Shall this then be a reward for incompe-
tence and a punishment for competence? Are litigation lawyers
the only ones to be selected? Shall the struggling sole practi-
tioner bear the same responsibility as the senior partner in a 200-
person law firm supported by a lucrative corporate practice?
The problem is further compounded by trying to devise a fair
method of selection. If attorneys are to be chosen from a lottery,
65. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979). 'The
touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness. Whether due process requires
the appointment of counsel in a particular case depends on the interests involved
and the nature of the proceedings." Id. at 27, 593 P.2d at 229, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
66. 269 Cal. App. 2d 495, 499, 74 Cal. Rptr. 771, 774 (1969).
67. Id.
for example, who should be included? Some of the potential nom-
inees that come to mind when conjuring up a list is the following:
(1) attorneys who live, but do not work in the particular jurisdiction
involved;
(2) attorneys who work in the particular jurisdiction involved, but do
not belong to the local bar association;
(3) attorneys whose offices are located in other judicial districts, but
who belong to the local bar association of the particular jurisdiction in-
volved (In addition, there are multitudinous bar associations whose mem-
bers share such common interests as speciality, ethnicity, geographic
location);
(4) attorneys employed by public agencies other than the public de-
fender (Here the court must bear in mind statutory prohibitions as well as
possible conflicts of interest.);
(5) attorneys licensed to practice law, but who are engaged in other
pursuits such as business, teaching or politics;
(6) attorneys who serve as pro tem judges, or participate in volunteer
pro bono programs (Should they be excluded from the lottery? How does
one determine the extent of their participation in these programs?).
Others may contemplate even greater betes noires by adding
new combinations and categories to this list.68
There must be state-appropriated funds with which to compen-
sate defense counsel in these matters. Constitutional rights are
not measured or limited by monetary considerations.
"[V] indication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made
dependent upon any fact that it is less expensive to deny than to
afford them."69
VI. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA
Earlier, the question was posed of what the court should do
when the indigent civil defendant asked for counsel in a state-ini-
tiated paternity action. The court should first try to obtain volun-
teer counsel.7 0 This method may not be effective in securing
counsel in all cases.
Another coercive method would be to make, as a condition for
placement on the list of conflict attorneys7 1 , the requirement that
an attorney also take a given number of uncompensated cases
representing indigent defendants in state-initiated paternity ac-
68. Formulating a list is analogous to the Lord High Executioner describing
his list of potential victims, "whose loss will be a distinct gain to society at large,"
who concludes that "the task of filling up the blanks I'd rather leave to you, But it
really doesn't matter whom you put upon the list, For they'd none of 'em be
missed-they'd none of 'em be missed!" W. GILBERT, THE MUADo, Act I.
69. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 538 (1963). See also Arreola v. Municipal
Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 108, 113-14, 88 Cal. Rptr. 529, 531 (1983).
70. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Bradshaw v. District Court of
California, 472 F.2d 515 (1984).
71. A conflict attorney is appointed by the court when the public defender de-
clares a conflict of interest. See also supra note 12.
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tions. The rationale for this selection is that the conflict attorney
is already being compensated. This solution should also be re-
jected on equal protection grounds. A class of attorneys which
has a statutory right to compensation for specific legal services
should not have its right to compensation diluted.
The court simply would not be able to proceed with the action
unless the county or state provides reasonable compensation for
appointed counsel. In such a case, the plaintiff's county will
either move the court to dismiss the action without prejudice, or
to stay the action until the appointment of counsel is made. What
if the plaintiff fails to so move? May the court dismiss the action
without prejudice on its own motion? In County of Tulare v.
Ybarra,72 the appellate court concluded that there was no author-
ity for the trial court to dismiss a state-instituted paternity action
where the alleged father claims indigency and no public funds are
available to pay for appointed counsel.
Such authority does exist in those instances where conflicting
constitutional issues clash. The inherent powers granted to the
trial court by section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure include
the authority to "control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice."73 This provision is suffi-
ciently broad so as to give the trial court the power to dismiss
state-instituted paternity actions when an indigent defendant's
constitutional right to counsel in a state-initiated paternity action
is jeopardized.74
When the state undertakes to prosecute a paternity or child
support action against an indigent, it must bear the expenses nec-
essary to comply with the provisions of the state and federal con-
stitutions. These include, if necessary, the compensation of
72. 143 Cal. App. 3d 580, 129 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1983).
73. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 128 (West Supp. 1984).
74. Important rights of children as well as the state are involved in the prose-
cution of paternity actions. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d at 33-34, 593 P.2d at 234, 154
Cal. Rptr. at 529. We are not suggesting that insuperable barriers be placed in the
way of the state so as to prevent the prosecution of paternity actions against indi-
gent defendants, even though it is unlikely that indigent defendants would be able
to pay child support. It must be remembered, however, that lawsuits, whether
criminal or civil, are subject to the Constitution. For example, in County of Los
Angeles v. Soto, 35 Cal. 3d 483, 492 n.4, 674 P.2d 750, 756 n.4, 198 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785
n.4 (1984), the supreme court pointed out that "[e]ven the stability of family rela-
tionships, however, cannot outweigh the defendant's right to set aside a judgment
entered on the basis of an involuntary waiver of the right to any hearing on the
question of paternity." Id.
counsel.75
VII. CONCLUSION
Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475 was designed to
recoup public funds expended on behalf of AFDC recipients.7 6 It
is a creature of the legislature. It is therefore incumbent upon the
legislature to provide the financial support necessary to meet the
requirments that the statute sets. If the state does not wish to ap-
propriate funds sufficient to pay for appointed counsel, should it
expect the legal profession to fill this void by subsidizing a cost
that should be borne by the tax-paying public?
75. An effort by the California legislature to provide funding for attorneys ap-
pointed to represent indigents in civil matters was vetoed by Governor
Deukmejian on September 28, 1984. In his veto message, Governor Deukmejian
stated that the bill (S.B. 2057), was an "open-ended appropriation which will be
subject to substantial expansion by the court." "Governor Vetoes Funding Bill for
Lawyers, Courts," L.A. Daily J., October 1, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
76. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11475 (West Supp. 1984).
